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NOTES
THE VIRGINIA HABITUAL OFFENDER ACT*
In the past, Virginia's traffic safety laws have been ineffective in
stemming the rising number of accidents, injuries and deaths which
occur each year.' One of the basic defects of these traffic safety regulations apparently has been the lack of penalties severe enough to remove from the streets and highways of the state those individuals who
continually disregard Virginia's traffic laws. In response to this prob2
lem, the 1968 General Assembly enacted the Habitual Offender Act.
Within the Act's provisions, the General Assembly sought not only
to promote traffic safety by indefinitely revoking an habitual traffic
offender's driving privileges but also to insure that the Act would be
stringently enforced by including a detailed mandatory procedure.
Accordingly, a study of the Act is necessary to ascertain whether its
detailed provisions and its operational procedures will furnish the
means of removing habitual offenders and promoting traffic safety
on Virginia's highways. However, before the Act is examined in detail,
a review of the general features of the Act is necessary to give perspective and direction to this study.
*The Washington and Lee Law Review wishes to acknowledge its indebtedness
to Judge J. Randolph Tucker, Jr., Hustings Court, City of Richmond, Virginia;
Mr. Charles S. Cox, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Division of Motor Vehicles;
Mr. W. H. Brillheart, Director of Bureau of Safety Responsibility, Division of Motor
Vehicles; Mr. T. C. Van Zile, Jr., Bureau of Safety Responsibility, Division of
Motor Vehicles; and Mr. John E. Shinholser, Public Relations Director, Virginia
Association of Insurance Agents, Inc., for their contributions in the preparation of
this article.
'With increasing numbers of vehicles, drivers and travel, Virginia by 1967 had
acquired an alarming set of highway traffic safety data. Over 1,220o persons were
killed and 43,122 persons were injured in the iii,o61 traffic crashes reported on

Virginia's highways in that year alone. DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, VIRGINIA
TRAFFIC CRAsH FACrs 5 (1967). For the same period, property damage was $87,ooo,ooo and the total economic lose was estimated as $23o,oooooo. Even more alarming, these statistics represented the seventh consecutive year of rapid growth in
each category and the death toll of over 1,220 surpassed the all-time Virginia record
of traffic fatalities occurring in a single year. The former record was 1,11o deaths
in 1941. Id. at 3. Of particular significance is the fact that 84 percent of the reported accidents involved a violation of Virginia's traffic laws. Id. at 5.
-VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-387.1-.12 (Supp. 1968) (hereafter referred to as the
Act). The Act was enacted into law on April 4, 1968, and became effective on June
28, 1968. No. H 104, ch. 476, [1968] AcTs OF ASSEMBLY Reg. Sess. 642.
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INTRODUCTION

The new Virginia Habitual Offender Act seeks to cope with the
menace to public safety, as represented by the frequent violator of
Virginia's traffic laws, by the direct approach of denying him the
privilege of driving upon her streets and highways. This is accomplished by identifying and adjudging him an habitual offender as
prescribed under the detailed sections of the statue. The Act defines
an habitual offender as any person who has accumulated within any
ten year period a record of convictions for three serious violations3 or
for twelve lesser violations or for any combination of serious and lesser
violations totalling twelve. 4 If an individual's driving record shows a
sufficient number of convicitons to bring him within the definition of
an habitual offender, the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) is required
to certify his record to the Commonwealth's attorney of the licensee's
place of residence, 5 and the Commonwealth's attorney in turn is
required to file an information against such person with the court
of record having jurisdiction over his residence. 6 This court must
then order the suspected habitual offender to appear and show cause
7
as to why he should not lose the privilege of driving in Virginia.
If the court adjudges this individual to be an habitual offender,
it must then: (i) order him not to drive in Virginia thereafter and
(2) confiscate his Virginia operator's license. 8 Restoration of the privilege -to drive in Virginia and reissuance of an operator's license 9 may
not be granted until at least ten years after the prohibitory order is
issued and then only upon the court's discretionary determination of
a showing of good cause by the habitual offender.10 To insure that
the removal of an habitual offender from Virginia's highways is
effective, the Act makes disobedience of the prohibitory order a felony,
punishable by confinement in the penitentiary for a period ranging
from one to five years."l No portion of this sentence may be suspended
except where the disobedience of the prohibitory order was necessitat12
ed by an extreme emergency to save life or limb.
WA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2(a) (Supp. 1968).
4
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2(b) (Supp. 1968).
'VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.3 (Supp. 1968).

6VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-3874 (Supp. 1968).
WA. CoDE ANN.

§

46.1-387.5 (Supp. x968).

"VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.6 (Supp. 1968).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.7 (Supp. 1968).
0

" VA. CoDE ANN. § 46.1-387.9 (Supp. 1968).
EVA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.8 (Supp. 1968).
2VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.8 (Supp. 1968).
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With the foregoing review of the general features of the Act to give
perspective and direction, a detailed analysis is necessary to understand
its separate provisions and their operation. Realistic and informed
conclusions as to the Act's overall effectiveness in eliminating habitual
offenders from Virginia's highways can only be ascertained by a careful examination of its individual parts. 13
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE

§ 46.1-387.1. Declarationof policy. -It is hereby declared to
be the policy of Virginia: (I) To provide maximum safety for
all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways of
the State; and
(2) To deny the privilege of operating motor vehicles on
such highways to persons who by their conduct and record
have demonstrated their indifference for the safety and welfare
of others and their disrespect for the laws of the Commonwealth,
the orders of her courts and the statutorily required acts of her
administrative agencies; and
(3)To discourage repetition of criminal acts by individuals
against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth and her
political subdivisions and to impose increased and added deprivation of the privilege to operate motor vehicles upon habitual offenders who
have been convicted repeatedly of violations
4
of traffic laws.'
Where a law contains an express declaration of the public policy
it seeks to establish, the duty of the judiciary is to interpret its language and provisions so as to effectuate those stated purposes. 15 This
section clearly states that the fundamental purpose of the Act is
the promotion of highway safety by denying and curtailing the driving
privileges of habitual traffic law violators. From the perspective of
such an explicit declaration it seems that the courts must view the
detailed definition of an habitual offender, 16 the several mandatory
provisions, 17 the indeterminate driving prohibition,' 8 and the rigorous
1

' Hereafter, sections of the Act are set out verbatim with margins wider than
those of the main text.
'VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.1 (Supp. 1968).
"United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 31o U.S. 534 (1940); Temple v.
City of Petersburg, 182 Va. 418, 29 S.E.2d 357 (1944); Town of South Hill v.
Allen, 177 Va. 154, 12 S.E.2d 77 (1941); Woodward v. City of Staunton, 161 Va.
671, 17, S.E. 59o (1933); Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Town of Cape Charles, 144 Va.
56, 131 S.E. 437 (1926)"VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2 (Supp. 1968).

1VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-387.3-.7 (Supp. 1968).
'8VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.6 (Supp. 1968).
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enforcement section' 9 as components of a statutory plan carefully
drafted to carry out the expressed policy of the General Assembly.
However, under our system of law legislatures do not possess unlimited powers; the public policies they promulgate as well as the
statutory means to carry out those policies are subject to judicial re20
view for compliance with the appropriate constitutional restraints.
Thus, it is of particular significance that the Supreme Court of

Appeals of Virginia has specifically recognized and approved, as a
constitutionally valid legislative purpose, the protection of the public

21
by removing dangerous motorists from the highways.
Subsections (2) and (3) of this section appear to contemplate reliance upon the long standing Virginia rule that the acquisition and
retention of a motor vehicle operator's license is a mere privilege rather
than a right.22 Since the privilege is granted by the state in the form
of a license or permit, it is subject to such reasonable conditions,
regulations and controls as the legislature deems appropriate -to impose
23
under its police powers in the interest of public safety and welfare.

Thus in Virginia a driver's license may be denied, suspended or
revoked administratively without raising constitutional objections as
24
to due process.

18VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.6 (Supp. 1968).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.8 (Supp. 1968).
-OMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (18o3); THE FEDERALIST No. 78

(Hamilton).
2'Lamb v. Clark, 199 Va. 374, 99 S.E.2d 597 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel Lamb
v. Hill, 196 Va. 18, 82 S.E.2d 473 (1954).
22Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941); Commonwealth v. Ellett,
174 Va. 403, 4 S.E.2d 762 (1939); Law v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 449, 199 S.E. 516
(1938), citing with approval, Nulter v. State Road Comm'n, 119 W. Va. 312, 193

S.E. 549 (1937); Hannabass v. Ryan, 164 Va. 519, 18o S.E. 416 (1935). The issue as
to whether an operator's license represents a right or a privilege has been the
subject of many articles. E.g., J. REESE, THE LEGAL NATURE OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE
(1965); Comment, 73 HARV. L. REV. 595 (1960).
2Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941). E.g., Thornhill v.
Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1953); Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961);
Larr v. Dignan, 317 Mich. 121, 26 N.W.2d 872 (1947); Barbieri v. Morris, 315 S.W.2d
711 (Mo. 1958); Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (1936); Gillaspie

v. Department of Pub. Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953); State v. Stehlek,
262 Wis. 642, 56 N.W.2d 514 (1953).

APrichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941);

Commonwealth v.

Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 4 S.E.2d 762 (1939); Law v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 449, 199

S.E. 516 (1938). However, it must be remembered that the administrative agency
or official may neither abuse the discretionary power nor permit it to be arbitrary
or capricious in revoking a driver's license. Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has ruled that the
suspension or revocation of a driver's license, even when it follows
a conviction for a specific traffic violation, is not part of the criminal
penalty nor is it considered an additional punishment. 25 Furthermore,
it has been held that the revocation or suspension of a driver's license
is civil rather than criminal in nature.2 0 Conspicuously absent from
this section is language typical of criminal statutes that invoke punishment and other punitive measures. Although subsection (3) declares
one of the Act's purposes to be the discouragement of the repetition of
criminal acts, this alone is not sufficient to give the Act a penal
character since deterrence of wrongful conduct may be an objective
of a regulatory statute as well as a punitive one. 27 Furthermore, this
subsection's imposition of "increased and added deprivation of the
privilege to operate motor vehicles upon habitual offenders who have
been convicted repeatedly of violations of traffic laws ' 28 has been a
valid administrative procedure under both mandatory29 and discreS.E. 579 (ig3o); Note, The Administrative Hearing for the Suspension of a Driver's
•
License, 3o N.C.L. REV. 27, 45 (1951)
It seems that the significance of the privilege concept may be questionable in
view of the standards Virginia has required for her revocation procedures. E.g.,
Lamb v. Taylor, 198 Va. 621, 96 S.E.2d 124 (1957) (judicial review of administrative
suspension); Butler v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 411, 53 S.E.2d 152 (1949) (notice of
administrative hearing). See also Comment, 21 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163 (1964).
These are essentially the same standards as those required in states which view
a driver's license as a right or liberty. E.g., Wall v. King, 20o6 F.2d 878 (1st Cir.
1953); State v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d i8o (1961); Moore v. MacDuff,
309 N.Y. 35, 127 N.E.2d 741 (1955);

Berberian v. Lussier, 87 R.I. 226,

139 A.2d

869 (1958). Therefore, it appears that the Act compares favorably with the accepted requirements of due process under either the "mere privilege" or "right"
views. Note, The Administrative Hearing for the Suspension of a Driver's License,
3o N.C.L. Rv. 27 (1951)ZE.g., Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941). E.g., People v.
O'Rourke, 124 Cal. App. 752, 13 P.2d 989 (1932); Durfee v. Ress, 163 Neb. 768, 81
NAV.2d 148 (1957); Harrell v. Scheidt, 243 N.C. 735, 92 S.E.2d 182 (1956); Parker v.
State Highway Dep't., 224 S.C. 263, 78 S.E.2d 382 (1953).
-!Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941). E.g., Commonwealth v.
Halteman, 192 Pa. Super. 379, 162, A.2d 251 (1960); Parker v. State Highway Dep't,
224 S.C. 263, 78 S.E.2d 382 (1953).
"Examples of regulatory laws which deter wrongful conduct and have not
been considered punitive or criminal statutes are furnished by the enabling acts
which established the following well known federal government agencies: ICC,
SEC, FCC, NLRB, and the Pure Food & Drug Administration. E.g., McDermott
v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913); United States v. Kordel, 164 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.
1947), afj'd, 335 U.S. 345 (1948).

sVA. CODE ANN. § 46.-13871(3) (Supp. 1968).
- Lamb v. Curry, 197 Va. 395, 89 S.E.2d 329 (1955); Commonwealth v. Ellett,
174 Va. 403, 4 S.E.2d 762 (1939).
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tionary3o suspension or revocation provisions of other portions of the
motor vehicle laws of Virginia. In short, it seems the new Act establishes a regulatory scheme designed specifically for application to
habitual offenders by employing and extending administrative measures and procedures already known to and approved by the State's
judiciary, 31 thereby avoiding a conclusion that the Act is criminal in
nature.
DEFINITION OF HABITUAL OFFENDER

§ 46.1-387.2. Habitual offender defined. -An habitual offender shall be any person, resident or nonresident, whose
record, as maintained in the office of the Division of Motor
Vehicles, shows that such person has accumulated the convictions, or findings of not innocent in the case of a juvenile, for
separate and distinct offenses, described in subsections (a), (b)
and (c), of this section, committed within a ten-year period,
provided that where more than one included offense shall be
committed within a six-hour period such multiple offenses
shall, on the first such occasion, be treated for the purposes of
this article as one offense provided the person charged has no
record of prior offenses chargeable under this article, and provided further the date of the offense most recently committed
occurs on or after June twenty-eight, nineteen hundred sixtyeight and within ten years of the date of all other offenses the
conviction3 2for which is included in subsections (a), (b) or (c)
as follows:
While the first section of the Act generally describes the nature
and conduct of habitual traffic offenders, it is section 46.1-387.-2 which
prescribes the specific and detailed criteria one must meet to fall
within the statutory definition of the term "habitual offender".
Briefly, an habitual offender is any person who has accumulated
within any ten year period a record of convictions3 3 for three serious
3°Commonwealth ex rel. Joyner v. Butler, 191 Va. 193, 61 S.E.2d 12 (1950).
3'Compare VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 46.1-430 to -437 (Repl. Vol. 1967) (statutory procedures wherein the DMV may suspend or revoke the license of a driver determined
at an administrative hearing to be habitually negligent or reckless) with VA. CoDE
ANN. §§ 46.1-587.2 to -587.6, -587.10 (Supp. 1968). See Lamb v. Clark, 199 Va. 374,
99 S.E.2d 597 (1957); Lamb v. Rubin, 198 Va. 628, 96 S.E.2d 8o (1957); Lamb v.
Mozingo, 198 Va. 452, 94 S.E.2d 457 (1956); Commonwealth ex rel. Lamb v. Hill,
196 Va.
18, 82 S.E.2d 475 (1954).
2
2 VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-587.2 (Supp. 1968).
nSince the definition of an habitual offender is based upon a record of accumlated convictions, the meaning of "conviction" becomes vital to effective application of the Act. A liberal interpretation of the term is necessary to give broad
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violations 34 or for twelve lesser violations or for any combination of
serious and lesser violations totalling twelve. 33 Serious violations are
limited to those listed in subsection (a) of this section while lesser
violations under subsection (b) are those for which one's driver's
license may be suspended for at least thirty days. With regard to either
subsection, only one of the requisite number of violations within ten
years must occur subsequent to the date enactment.
This section also contains a six-hour provision with respect to
multiple offenses 36 which mitigates the effect of subsections (a) and
(b) by preventing the inclusion in the Act of such multiple offenses.
Its effect is to regard such multiple offenses committed within a sixhour period as but one offense under the Act, provided that no other
convictions cognizable by the Act exist in a driver's record. 37
Clearly this rule is aimed solely at the case of a "first-time" offender
since a driver with a record of prior convictions is expressly barred
from its benefit. Apparently the six-hour rule was intended to give
"first-time" offenders a warning and another opportunity after involvement in a multiple offense situation. 38 Thus a previously innocent
driver who commits an offense of multiple consequences 39 or whose
conduct violates several traffic laws simultaneously40 will receive but
coverage.

VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-389(a) (Repl. Vol. 1967) which defines conviction,
has been liberally construed so to effectuate the legislative intent of the motor
vehicle code. See Lamb v. Parsons, 195 Va. 353, 78 S.E.2d 707 (1953). In addition,
the Act itself specifically provides for out-of-state convictions to be treated as
Virginia convictions so long as the foreign law conforms substantially to its Virginia equivalent. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2(C) (Supp. 1968).
OVA.

CODE ANN.

§ 46.1-387.2(a) (Supp. 1968).

u-VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2(b) (Supp. 1968).
*'Precisely what constitutes a multiple offense or for what purpose the provision was intended is not clear. See text accompanying notes 39-40 infra; see note

41 infra.
wMany minor traffic violations are not cognizable under the Act. These include
improper driving, failure to stop at stop sign or red traffic signal, driving in the
wrong direction on a one-way street and "U" turns at improper location, unless
the driver is charged and convicted of reckless driving. Only those prior offenses
contemplated in section 46.1-387.2(a) & (b) would prevent the application of the
six-hour provision.
nInterview with Mr. Charles S. Cox, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, in Richmond, Virginia, April 5, 1968.
®An example of a single act of multiple consequences is a single accident
wherein several persons are killed outright. The culpable driver would thereby
be subject to a manslaughter conviction for each victim. Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 582, 26 S.E.2d 54 (1943)' 0An example of a single act violating several traffic laws simultaneously is
speeding in the wrong direction on a one-way street, which may result in charges
of reckless driving as well as speeding. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-189 (Repl. Vol. 1967);
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-190 (Supp. I968).
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one offense for the purposes of the Act. At this point the six-hour rule
seems fair and consistent with the policy of eliminating habitual
offenders by treating an act which happens to have multiple consequences or to simultaneously violate several laws as a single act, since
it is not indicative of habitual conduct. However, it can be argued
that the restriction of the application of the six-hour rule to "firsttime" offenders only is both illogical and unfair. Such a claim could
be based on the premise that the fact of multiple consequences or
simultaneous violations itself may not be indicative of habitual conduct and that this is true regardless of whether or not one has a
41
record of previous convictions.
Another problem inherent in this section is the claim that the Act
may be unconstitutional as being retroactive or ex post facto. The
language of this section indicates that the General Assembly intended
to define an habitual offender as one who had been convicted of the
requisite number of offenses within any ten year period so long as
only one offense occurs after the date of enactment. The fact that
offenses committed prior to the Act may be utilized in an habitual
offender determination could lend support to the argument that the
42
Act is ex post facto and retroactive.
Apparently the argument of retroactivity is invalid in light of Vir4tit is conceivable that the six-hour rule might be interpreted as covering any
series of violations committed by a "first-time" offender within six hours without
regard as to whether they were unavoidably connected. Under such an interpretation a driver with no prior convictions could be charged with reckless driving or
speeding in several adjacent political subdivisions within six hours and receive
but one offense as far as the Act is concerned. Nothing could be more indicative
of disrespect and wantonly habitual disregard for the law. Such a construction
would dearly conflict with the basic policy and purpose of the Act. However, this
defect can be cured only by an amendment which definitely clarifies the intent
of the rule and which restricts a multiple offense to an offense of multiple consequences and a violation of several traffic laws simultaneously. See notes 39-4o
supra.

"Claims of retroactivity are not new in cases involving habitual traffic violator
statutes. Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1957); Durfee v. Ress, 163 Neb. 768,
81 N.W.2d 148 (1957); Thompson v. Thompson, 78 N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 1956); Cooley
v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 348 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). Barbieri v.
Morris, 315 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1958) upheld the suspension of a driver's license
pursuant to an habitual traffic violator statute authorizing such action upon proof
that the licensee had been convicted of four moving violations within a two year
period. Although only one of the appellant's alleged convictions was obtained
subsequent to the date the statute was enacted and the others predated the
statute's existence, the Supreme Court of Missouri specifically approved the statutory procedure as being constitutionally valid in answer to the claim that it was
retroactive and an ex post facto law.
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ginia law. A claim of retroactivity contemplates a violation of a right. 43
However, Virginia expressly recognizes the retention of a driver's
license as a mere privilege4 4 thereby negating the retroactivity argument. Lending support to this result is the fact that the Act expressly
provides that at least one offense must occur after its effective date. 45
This "additional offense" requirement appears to avoid the pitfalls
of a retroactivity argument by making the Act prospective in application. Regardless of how many offenses an individual has committed
prior to the Act, he can not be adjudged an habitual offender unless
he commits another offense subsequent to the passage of the Act. 46
A claim might also be made that the Act is unconstitutional in
that its revocation procedure imposes an additional penalty for prior
convictions for which one has been in former jeopardy and punished.
Such a claim, however, presupposes that the Act is a criminal statute
and also that withdrawal of a privilege is punishment.4 7 The Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, however, has held that the revocation
' 3Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.d 393 (1941); Commonwealth v. Ellett,
S.E.
516 (1938), citing with approval, Nulter v. State Road Comm'n, 119 W. Va. 312,
193 S.E. 549 (937). See also Barbieri v. Morris, 315 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1958).
"Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941); Commonwealth v. Ellett,
1741 Va. 403, 4 S.E.2d 762 (1939); Law v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 449, 199 S.E. 516
(1938), citing with approval, Nulter v. State Road Comm'n, i9 W.Va. 312, 193
S.E. 549 (1937).
'VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2 (Supp. 1968).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2 (Supp. 1968). The Virginia Association of Insurance Agents, Inc. (VAIA) commissioned the drafting of the Habitual Offender Bill
for presentation to the 1968 General Assembly. VIRGINIA TRAFFIc SAFETY STUDY
CoAnssIoN, AN ACrION PROGRAM TO MEET VIRGINIA's TRAFFIC SAFETY NEEDs 79
(1967). In September and October, 1967, VAIA conducted throughout Virginia
twelve Special Legislative Meetings for members and candidates of the General
Assembly to explain and advocate enactment of the Habitual Offender Bill. In
these programs it was emphasized that the "additional offense" requirement was
included to prevent retroactive effects. Presentation by Messrs. William H. Branch
and J. Nowell Trice, VAIA Legislature Committee Co-Chairmen, and Richard E.
Smith, Executive Secretary of VAIA, First Special Legislative Meeting, in Abingdon,
Sept. is, 1967.
' TAn argument that the Act is a criminal statute could point out the following:
use of an information to be filed in court of record with criminal jurisdiction as
required under section 46.1-387.4; violation of court order made a felony under
section 46.1-387.8; and appeals to be filed in manner and form of criminal case as
required under section 46.1-387.1o. An argument that the Act contemplates additional punishment could point to the following: statement in section 46.1-387.1(3)
as to discouragement of repetition of criminal acts; loss of privilege to drive in Virginia for at least ten years and possibly forever provided in sections 46.1-387.6,
-387.7., .387.9; exposure to feony conviction under section 46.1-387.8.
174 Va. 403, 4 S.E.2d 762 (1939); Law v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 449, ig
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of an operator's license is not a punishment 48 and that revocation
procedures are not criminal but administrative and designed for the
protection of the driving public. 49 This rationale would be equally
applicable to the Act thereby preventing any conclusion that the
revocation of an habitual offender's license is an imposition of an
additional criminal penalty.
A. Serious Offenses
§ 46.1-387-2 (Continued):
(a) Three or more convictions, or findings of not innocent in
the case of a juvenile, singularly or in combination, of the following separate and distinct offenses arising out of separate
acts.
(i) Voluntary or involuntary manslaughter resulting from
the operation of a motor vehicle;
(2) Driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicants or drugs in violation of § 18.1-54;
(3) Driving or operating a motor vehicle while impaired in
violation of

§

18.1-56.1;

(4) Driving a motor vehicle while his license, permit or
privilege to drive a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked in violation of §§ 18.1-6o, 46.1-350 or 46.1-351;
(5) Willfully operating a motor vehicle without a license
so to do;
(6) Knowingly making any false affidavit or swearing or
affirming falsely ,to any matter or thing required by the motor
vehicle laws or as to information required in the administration of such laws in violation of § 46.1-15;
(7) Any offense punishable as a felony under the motor
vehicle laws of Virginia or any felony in the commission of
which a motor vehicle is used;
(8) Failure of the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an
accident resulting in the death or injury of any person to stop
close to the scene of such accident and report his identity in
violation of

§

46.1-176; or

(9) Failure of the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an
accident resulting only in damage to an attended or unattended
vehicle or other property in excess of two hundred fifty dollars
to stop close to the scene of such accident and report his identity
or otherwise report such accident in violation of law5 0
18Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941). See also Tyson v. Hening,
205 Va. 389, 136 S.E.2d 832, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964). (Virginia recidivist
proceeding).
".Anglin v. Joyner, 181 Va. 660, 26 S.E.2d 58 (1943); Prichard v. Battle, 178
Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941). See also Tyson v. Hening, 2o5 Va. 389, 136 S.E.2d
832, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964).
t0VA. CoDE ANN. § 46.1-387.2(a) (Supp. 1968).
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Subsection (a) concerning serious violations requires that three
or more convictions must result from the enumerated "separate and
distinct offenses arising out of separate acts" for an individual to be
adjudged an habitual offender. Under the "separate act" provision
which is exclusive to subsection (a), several serious offenses arising out
of the same act will constitute only one conviction for the purposes of
the Act. However, varying interpretations are possible as to whether
this provision applies to offenses of like character i.e., two manslaughter offenses, or two offenses of a different character i.e., drunk
driving and manslaughter offenses, or to both.
The first and most logical interpretation is that multiple serious
offenses of either a like character or a different character emanating
from a common causal relationship would count as only a single
conviction under the Act. The basis for this is that this doctrine is
directed towards a mass accident situation where the different offenses
are causally linked, thereby arising out of the same act. Thus if a
drunk driver caused the death of several persons in a mass accident
and subsequently received a drunk driving conviction 1 and several
manslaughter convictions, 52 it would constitute but one conviction
under the Act. Such an interpretation is both fair and consistent with
the Act's objective in that it protects a driver who has committed a
wrongful act of multiple consequences since such act itself may not
be indicative of habitual conduct.
The second interpretation of the "separate act" requirement is
that multiple serious offenses of different character which arise from
the same act would count as only a single conviction under the Act.
The basis of this view is that "separate and distinct offenses" refers
to offenses of different character such as drunken driving and manslaughter. Since this phrase is the object of "arising out of separate
acts," it would control the "separate act" requirement. This interpretation limits the "separate act" requirement to offenses of different
aVirginia holds that there may be separate criminal prosecutions for the same
act violating separate and distinct laws wherein one offense is not necessarily included in another. Hundley v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 449, 69 S.E.2d 336 (1952);
Henson v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 829, 183 S.E. 438 (1936). Even where there has
been an acquittal on one charge this does not bar prosecution of the other on
grounds of double jeopardy. Dykeman v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 807, 113 S.E.2d
867 (1960).
rVirginia holds that there are as many separate and distinct offenses as there
are persons injured or killed by the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle. Thus
there may be a series of prosecutions for each person injured or killed without
constituting double jeopardy. Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 582, 26 S.E.2d 54
(1943)-
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character and would prevent any application of the doctrine to
offenses of like character. Thus in the situation where a drunk driver
fled the scene of a fatal collision, this interpretation would view these
offenses of different character as only one conviction for the purposes
of the Act. However, a driver causing the deaths of four persons in
a mass accident and subsequently receiving four manslaughter convictions, would be chargeable with four convictions under the Act
since the "separate act" doctrine would not apply to offenses of like
character.53
Regardless of which interpretation the "separate act" concept
may receive, it will be applicable only to the serious violations listed
in subsection (a), as subsection (b) contains no "separate act" language.
Although the six-hour rule also applies to multiple serious offenses
and covers any combination of such offenses occurring within six hours,
it is severely limited in scope due to the additional requirement that
the driver have no previous record of convictions cognizable under the
Act. However, the "separate act" doctrine is not restricted to "first-time"
violators only. Therefore, the "separate act" doctrine seems to govern
all serious multiple offenses not falling within the restricted scope of
the six-hour rule; but how it will treat such offenses is dependent
upon which interpretation of the doctrine prevails.
B. Minor Offenses
§ 46.1-387.2 (Continued):
(b) Twelve or more convictions, or findings of not innocent
in the case of a juvenile, of separate and distinct offenses,
singularly or in combination, in the operation of a motor
vehicle which are required to be reported to the Division of
Motor Vehicles and the commission whereof requires the Division of Motor Vehicles or authorizes a court to suspend or
revoke the privilege to operate motor vehicles on the highways
of this State for a period of thirty days or more and such convictions shall include those offenses enumerated in subsection
(a) above when taken with and added to those offenses described
herein. 54
53

The six-hour rule applies to any combination of offenses under section 46a387.2(a) regardless of which interpretation the "separate act" doctrine receives. So
long as a driver is a "first-time" violator and the multiple offenses occur within

six hours of each other, only one offense is chargeable under the Act's six-hour

rule. Distinctions as to whether offenses are of like or different character, whether
offenses are causally linked or not, whether offenses arise from the same or totally

unrelated acts would be irrelevant under the six-hour rule.
54VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2(b) (Supp. s968).
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The determination of an habitual offender on the basis of violations other than those enumerated in subsection (a) is controlled by
subsection (b). This subsection requires that at least twelve convictions
of separate and distinct offenses, either singularly or in combination,
must occur before a person may be adjudged an habitual offender.
The offenses cognizable under this subsection are those which are
required to be reported to the DMV,5 and for which the DMV is
required or a court is authorized to suspend or revoke the privilege
to drive for at least thirty days.
Two distinct elements are present within this subsection which will
be subject to diverse interpretations. The first is the limitation of the
thirty day minimum suspension or revocation requirement which
governs the types of traffic violations that are includible as convictions
within this subsection. The initial impression is that this limtation
is too restrictive; however, a careful perusal of the Code offenses indicates an opposite conclusion. All offenses for which the DMV must
suspend or revoke a license fall within the ambit of subsection (b)
since the Code sections authorizing such action specify that the
minimum periods be not less than sixty days. 56 Likewise, all offenses
involving the possibility of discretionary suspension or revocation by
the courts are chargeable under subsecton (b) since the appropriate
statutes permit revocation periods in excess of thirty days.57 Thus,
the habitual offender definition appears to cover all current Code
offenses either requiring the DMV or allowing the Virginia courts to
deprive a citizen of the privilege to drive.
In relation to this thirty day minimum requirement, it should be
noted that an offense may be includible under this subsection as long
as the court has the statutory authority to revoke or suspend the
license for thirty days, regardless of the court's exercise of that
authority. Thus as long as a court convicts in a case where it has the
power to suspend or revoke, it should make no difference whether
the court actually uses that power or to what extent the power is
rr-The reporting standard poses no problem as Virginia law requires every
Virginia court to maintain complete records of all traffic cases, abstracts of which
are forwarded to the DMV for inclusion in the permanent records of drivers. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.1-412 (Repl. Vol. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-413 (Supp. 1968).
OVA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-417.1, -419, -420 (Repl. Vol. 1967); see VA. CODE ANN. §
46.1-421 (Supp. 1968).

r'TVA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-191, -422, -424 (Repl. Vol.
section 46.1- 3 87.2(b) speaks of cases where the court is
suspend. Thus Code provisions which require the court to
be included. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-191, -197, -417.1, -423

1967). The language of
authorized to revoke or
revoke or suspend would
(Repl. Vol. 1967).
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used; the offense is chargeable under the Act because the court statutorily has the power to suspend or revoke for a period in excess of
the thirty day minimum. Therefore, those trial courts which fail to
invoke a thirty day suspension or revocation authorized by statute
will not frustrate the implementation and effectiveness of the Act.
The second element which presents a basic problem in this subsection is the ambiguity in the required number of convictions that
are necessary to adjudge a person an habitual offender. No ambiguity
is present in those individual Code offenses which automatically require the DMV or authorize the court to revoke or suspend the license
for thirty days; these singular convictions are clearly includible within
subsection (b) as one conviction. 58 The problem arises as to those Code
offenses requiring or authorizing license suspension or revocation only
for the commission of the second of such offenses.5 9 The first offense
alone clearly would not be includible within the Act. However, clarity
is lost when a second offense is committed within ,the time requiring
or authorizing license suspension or revocation. At that point the
question is whether the first and second offenses are to be separately
counted by the Act.
A basic example of this problem is that of speeding violations. A
single speeding violation cannot result in the loss of the driving
privilege 60 and therefore, cannot count as a conviction under subsection (b). If another speeding or a reckless driving occurs within
twelve months of the first, the DMV on receipt of 'the abstract of
conviction on the second charge is required to suspend the operator's
61A situation of two reckless driving offenses within twelve consecutive months
will result in two habitual offender counts since Virginia courts are authorized to
suspend or revoke a license for more than thirty days for a single occurrence. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.1-422 (Rep1. Vol. 1967). Similarly a reckless driving offense followed
within twelve months by a speeding violation would result in a count of two. Here
the reckless driving offense is cognizable under the Act by itself and the speeding
offense is cognizable as a result of the Code provision mandating a DMV revocation
for sixty days where a speeding violation follows a reckless driving violation within
twelve months. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-419, -420 (Repl. Vol. 1967). The identical
situation with the offenses reversed could be interpreted as but one count under the
Act. See text accompanying note 81 infra. The inconsistency and consequent need
for clarification in the interests of both fairness and effectiveness of the Act is readily
apparent.
O'VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-417(e) (two reckless driving offenses), -417(g) (two hit
and run offenses, each with an excess of $loo.oo property damages), -419 (two
speeding offenses), -420 (one speeding and one reckless driving offense) (Repl. Vol.
1967).
O0No Code provision exists for revocation or suspension of a driver's license for
a single offense alone,
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license for sixty days. 01 The second conviction is clearly to be counted
towards habitual offender status.
Confusion exists at this point as to whether the language of "singularly or in combination" makes the first speeding violation cognizable
for habitual offender purposes upon the conviction of the second speeding violation within twelve months. One view would favor such a
construction by reading "singularly or in combination" as meaning
that once the second offense has occurred, then both are cognizable
under the Act and can be counted as two convictions for habitual
offender purposes. An opposing view is that the first speeding offense
must remain ignored for the purposes of the Act inasmuch as it
could not be counted at the time of its occurrence because it would
not require the DMV or authorize a court to suspend the license
for thirty days. This construction is possible by reading the section's
language as meaning "singularly or in combination" with previous
offenses.0 2 The first interpretation permits fewer actual traffic offenses
before a driver is removed from the highways as an habitual offender.
Apparently the conflict of opinion will have to be resolved either by
the courts or the legislature.
C. Out-of-State Offenders
§46.1-387.2 (Continued):
(c) The offenses included in subsections (a) and (b) hereof
shall be deemed to include offenses under any valid town, city
or county ordinance paralleling and substantially conforming
to the State statutory provisions cited in subsection (a) and (b)
hereof and all changes in or amendments thereof, and any
federal law, any law of another state or any valid town, city or
county ordinance of another state substantially conforming to
the aforesaid State statutory provisions. 63
Subsection (c) specifically provides that convictions in other states
or in the federal domain where traffic laws are comparable to those of
Virginia are to be included as offenses under subsections (a) and (b).
Obviously no problems are presented where a Virginia resident has
been convicted both in Virginia and in other states of the requisite
violations and subsequently adjudged an habitual offender, since it
is well established that a Virginia driver's license may be revoked
on the basis of an out-of-state conviction so long as the commission
"VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-419, -420 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
"Letter from Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia, to C. H. Lamb,
Commissioner, Division of Motor Vehicles, June 4, 1968.
"VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2(c) (Supp. 1968).
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of the same act in Virginia is grounds for revocation. 64 Equally clear
is the situation where a resident or a nonresident has been convicted
of the necessary number of offenses in Virginia, provided that he
has a record maintained by the DMV.
A problem might arise, however, in two situations. The first situation is where a nonresident with a number of convictions from outof-state within the ten year period becomes a resident of Virginia and
acquires additional convictions which are sufficient to come within the
statutory definition of an habitual offender. The question here is
whether the Virginia DMV would have a record of convictions for
the period prior to Virginia residency. Although there is no specific
provision in the Code of Virginia requiring the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles to obtain such record, there would appear to be no
bar to its acquisition and subsequent application in the case of the
former nonresident, now a resident.65
A second situation is that of a nonresident convicted for the first
time in Virginia for an offense cognizable under the Act. The Act is
unclear as to whether the Virginia DMV could obtain an out-of-state
record of the appropriate number and type convictions and combine
the same with the Virginia conviction to have the nonresident adjudged an habitual offender. A liberal construction of the Act could
permit the DMV to acquire the record of a nonresident from his
home state since section 46.1-387.2 does not state that the record has
to be maintained by the DMV at -the time of the Virginia conviction.
Such a construction would be consistent with this section since it
expressly deems out-of-state offenses as included within the Act. On
the other hand it seems a nonresident could make a persuasive argument that the Act's reference to the record ".

.

. as maintained in the

"'Lamb v. Butler, 198 Va. 509, 95 S.E.2d 239 (1956); Lamb v. Smith, 195 Va.
1053, 81 S.E.2d 768 (1954); Nelson v. Lamb, 195 Va. 1043, 81 S.E.2d 762 (1954);
Scott v. Commonwealth ex rel. Joyner, 191 Va. 73, 6o S.E.2d 14 (1950). By statute
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is now required to revoke a Virginia license
upon receipt of official notification of conviction in another state of an offense
which if committed in Virginia, would constitute grounds for revocation. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.1-466 (Repl. Vol. 1967). The only limitation imposed is that the
period of such revocation in Virginia may not be longer than the period provided
in the state where such conviction occurred. Nelson v. Lamb, 195 Va. 1043, 81 S.E.2d
762 (1954).
5Since Virginia may use out-of-state convictions to support license suspensions
or revocations of her own residents, it seems both illogical and inconsistent to
permit a new resident to escape similar treatment merely because he acquired his
record prior to becoming a Virginia resident. Furthermore, an habitual offender is
equally as dangerous on Virginia's highways whether he is a resident or a nonresident. See note 64 supra.

1969]

NOTES

office of the Division of Motor Vehicles.... -6 means or at least
strongly implies that the legislature contemplated records already on
file at the DMV prior to the occurrence of an offense in Virginia and
not to a record compiled by the DMV subsequent to such offense.
A practical difficulty common to all out-of-state violations of residents or nonresidents is assuring that the DMV will have knowledge
thereof and obtain the necessary conviction records. Although this
sub-section specifically provides for the use of such information, it
makes no attempt to either require or assist the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles in such an effort. At present the acquisition of such
data is dependent upon existing arrangements between Virginia and
her sister states.6 7 However, as the exchange of driver record information grows in the future, it seems quite logical to expect its use under
the Act in order to render the detection of habitual offenders more
efficient.
DMV REcoRD
§46.1-3873.. Commissioner to certify transcript or abstract
of conviction record of habitual offender to attorney for Commonwealth; transcript or abstract as evidence.-The Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles shall certify, substantially in the manner provided for in § 46.1-34.1, three
transcripts or abstracts of the conviction record as maintained
in the office of the Division of Motor Vehicles of any person
whose record brings him within the definition of an habitual
offender, as defined in § 46.1-387.2 to the attorney for the
Commonwealth of the political subdivision in which such person resides according to the records of the Division or the attorney for the Commonwealth of the city of Richmond if such
CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2 (Supp. 1968).
'in order to ascertain the arrangements between Virginia and her sister states
as to the exchange of conviction records, a questionnaire was forwarded to the
licensing authority of all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Of those states
that replied, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin, stated that they sent records of convictions to Virginia. Hawaii and Ohio
replied that such records can be obtained upon request; and Massachusetts answered
in the negative. Maryland responded in light of section 46.1-179. 3 of the Code of
Virginia, which provides that the Commissioner is required to suspend the license of
any resident who fails to comply with a traffic citation issued by either the State
of Maryland or the District of Columbia. Such suspension shall continue until
the Commissioner has received a report that such resident has complied with the
citation. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-179.3 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
03VA.
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person is not a resident of this State. Such transcript or abstract
may be admitted as evidence as provided in § 46.1-34.1. Such
transcript or abstract shall be prima facie evidence that the
person named therein was duly convicted, or held not innocent
in the case of a juvenile, by the court wherein such conviction
or holding was made, of each offense shown by such transcript
or abstract; and if such person shall deny any of the facts as
stated therein, he shall have the burden of proving that such
fact is untrue.08
If the Habitual Offender Act is to accomplish its stated purpose
of promoting traffic safety in Virginia, it is essential that those persons
coming within the definition of an habitual offender under section
46.1-387.2 be identified so -that the appropriate proceedings under the
Act can be initiated. Section 46.1-387.3 commands the Commissioner
of the DMV to forward a transcript or abstract of the record of detected habitual offenders to the Commonwealth's attorney for the political
subdivision of Virginia in which the offender resides and, in the case
of nonresidents, to the Commonwealth's attorney for Richmond.
Implicit in this mandate is the duty of the DMV to establish a continuous system of reviewing records to detect habitual offenders. 69
This section allocates three burdens of proof. First, the transcript
or abstract of the DMV record "shall be prima facie evidence that
the person named therein was duly convicted ...of each offense
shown ....- 70 Complementing the prima facie rule, this section also
fixes the burden of proof upon any challenge of the record's validity
upon its challenger. The third burden is that in any proceeding where
such transcript or abstract is to be admitted into evidence the Commonwealth must bear the burden of proving that the person before
the court is the person named in the record. In that the prima fade
rule is directed only towards the person named in the record, the
Commonwealth must link the defendant with the record before the
68VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.3 (Supp. 1968).

cAt the same time it enacted the Habitual Offender Act, the 1968 General
Assembly added section 46.1-413.1 to the motor vehicle laws of Virginia. VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.1-413.1 (Supp. 1968). It requires all officers arresting drivers for certain
traffic violations to request abstracts of their driving records from the DMV and
to furnish them to the Commonwealth's attorney with jurisdiction over the case.
Significantly, most violations requiring such a request for a record abstract are also
offenses within the definition of an habitual offender. Compare VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.1-413.1 (Supp. 1968) with VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2 (Supp. 1968). This section
then complements section 46.1-387.3 of the Act in the discovery of habitual offenders by insuring that a violator's record will be brought to the attention of the
DMV and the Commonwealth's attorney.
"VA.

CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.3 (Supp. 1968).
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prima facie rule is operative. These rules apply to all proceedings
7
under the Act. 1
Beginning with the requirement in this section, the Act has a
progressive series of mandatory provisions governing the procedure
for determining whether a driver is an habitual offender. 72 The proceedings once instituted must result in either an adjudication that the
individual is an habitual offender or in dismissal of the proceedings
against him.73 Administratively such a process should operate with
a maximum of both speed and certainty of a hearing on the issue of
whether the accused is an habitual offender. No harm will have been
done to the accused as the procedure assures him a judicial hearing
while denying the possibility of either avoiding or delaying such
hearing at some prior point in the preliminary process. Apparently the
legislature sought to assure that the procedures of the Act will be fully
implemented by the inclusion of mandatory provisions.74
FILING OF INFORMATION

§ 46.1-.87.4. Information to be filed by attorney for Commonwealth.-The attorney for the Commonwealth, upon receiving the aforesaid transcripts or abstracts from the Commissioner, shall forthwith file information against the person
named therein in the court of record having jurisdiction of
criminal offenses in the politcial subdivision in which such person resides. In the event such person is a nonresident of this
71

VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-34.1 (Repl. Vol. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.3
(Supp. 1968).
72VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-387.3 to -387.6 (Supp. 1968).
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.6 (Supp. 1968).
7
"Alternative methods which the legislature could have adopted do not seem to
as effectively combine considerations of efficiency and swiftness with minimal harm
to an accused as does the Act. An administrative law approach could have provided
either for a hearing before an examiner of the DMV, followed by revocation upon
a finding of the accused as an habitual offender which is similar to present procedure
under VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-430 (Repl. Vol. 1967); or for revocation by the Division
of Motor Vehicles based solely on a review of its records with a right to a subsequent hearing if the accused desired to challenge the administrative action. The
"hearing-revocation" technique involves the following possible disadvantages: delay
in hearing due to insufficent numbers of examiners, increased cost of providing
more examiners, and the possible reluctance of courts to permit a lifetime revocation based solely upon administrative action. While the "revocation-hearing" procedure would offer the most rapid means possible for removal of an habitual
offender from the highways, it could cause inconvenience and harm to a motorist
experiencing an erroneous revocation. The legislature also could have provided
a procedure calling for the Commonwealth's attorney to file a civil suit against
an apparent habitual offender in order to obtain a status determination and revoking order. Such a procedure, however, would afford an accused the opportunity
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State, the attorney for the Commonwealth of the city of Richmond shall file information against the accused person in the
Circuit Court of the city of Richmond. 75
This section directs the Commonwealth's attorney receiving the
record 76 of a suspected habitual offender from the DMV to file an
information in the appropriate court against the person named in
the record. 77 In conjunction with section 46.1-387.3, this section designates which courts shall have jurisdiction over habitual offender
determinations. For Virginia residents the appropriate court is the
court of record with criminal jurisdiction over the place of residence,
while the cases of nonresidents are to be heard by the Circuit Court
of the City of Richmond. Occasionally problems may arise as to the
proper court for jurisdiction over the case of a citizen of Virginia who
is temporarily absent from the state. The Attorney General of Virginia has recently rendered an opinion in the case of a Virginia serviceman overseas which states that the proper venue lies in the Circuit
78
Court of the City of Richmond.
ADOUDICATION PROCEDURE

§ 46.1-387.5. Show cause order; service on person named as
habitual offender; procedure where conviction denied.-The
court in which such information is filed shall enter an order,
which incorporates the aforesaid transcript or abstract and is
directed to the person named therein, to show cause why he
should not be barred from operating a motor vehicle on the
highways of this State. A copy of the show cause order and such
to employ delaying procedural tactics prior to trial. The procedure of the Act
avoids these problems and seems to adequately balance the public interest and
the rights of the accused.
'VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-887.4 (Supp. 1968).
"Actually the Commonwealth's attorney receives a transcript or abstract of
the official record as maintained by the DMV. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-34.1 (Repl. Vol.
1967) makes the transcript or abstract fully equivalent to the actual record itself and
admissible into evidence with the same status as the actual record. Hereafter the
terms record and transcript or abstract are used interchangeably.
7Since VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387. 3 (Supp. 1968) expressly makes the DMV
record prima facie evidence that the person named therein was duly convicted
of the offenses shown, there is no reason for the Commonwealth's attorney to have
been vested with discretion as to whether an information should be filed. Such a
mandatory requirement is consistent with the apparent legislative purpose of
creating an administrative procedure from detection of an individual as a suspected
-habitual offender to adjudication with no possibility of avoidance. See note 74 supra
and accompanying text.
sLetter from Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia, to Robert C.
Goad, Commonwealth's Attorney for Nelson County, Virginia, Mar. 13, 1969.
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transcript or abstract shall be served on the person named therein in the manner prescribed by law for the service of notices.
Services thereof on any nonresident of the State may be made
by the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles in the
same manner as in any action or proceeding arising out of a
a collision on the highways of this State in the manner provided in § § 8-67.1 and 8-67.2, which are hereby made applicable
mutatis mutandis to these proceedings, and the Commonwealth
shall pay a fee of five dollars to the Commissioner for making
such service and such fee shall be taxed against the defendant
as a part of the cost of such proceeding.
If such person denies he was convicted or held not innocent
of any offense necessary for a holding that he is an habitual
offender, and if the court cannot, on the evidence available to
it, make such determination, the court may certify the decision
of such issue to the court in which such conviction or holding
of not innocent was made. The court to which such certification
is made shall forthwith conduct a hearing to determine such
issue and send a certified copy of its final order determining
such issue to the court in which such information was filed.7 9
Upon the filing of the information by the Commonwealth's attorney, the court must issue an order which incorporates the DMV
record, and direct it to the person named in the record to show cause
as to why he should not be adjudged an habitual offender and consequently lose his privilege to drive upon the highways of Virginia.80
Upon successful service the show cause order has the effect of giving
notice and constituting a summons thereby making an appearance
obligatory upon Virginia residents.8' For nonresidents this section
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.5 (Supp. 1968).
8OThe language of section 46.1-387.5 is mandatory upon the court and permits
no discretion whatsoever in the issuance of the show cause order. At this point in
the procedure everything before the court indicates that the person named in the
record is an habitual offender. The court has before it only the information and
the attached DMV record which is prima facie evidence that the person named
therein was duly convicted of all offenses shown. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.3 (Supp.
1968).
6lIt is believed that the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond made the first
adjudication under the Act on January 7, 1969. Three Virginians were declared
habitual offenders by Judge J. Randolph Tucker, Jr. Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Jan. 8, 1969, § B, p. 4, col. 5. The show cause orders issued in those cases gave
notice of the information previously filed by the Commonwealth's attorney, directed
the person named to appear before the court at a specified time, and directed the
City Sergeant to serve a copy of the show cause order and an abstract of the DMV
record upon the person named. Letter from Judge J. Randolph Tucker, Jr. to the
Washington and Lee Law Review, Feb. 24, 1969, on file in Washington and
Lee Law Library.
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specifically permits substituted service of process8 2
Once service of process has been effectuated, any attempt to avoid
the consequences of the Act by either refusing or failing to appear
in response to the show cause order will be unavailing. The General
Assembly provided for this contingency by the addition in section
46.1-387.3 of the prima facie presumption. If not attacked, the record
is presumed to be valid, and necessitates a finding as an habitual
offender and issuance of an order barring future motor vehicle opera8s
tion in Virginia.
When a defendant84 appears in court in response to the show
cause order, there are four major defenses or pleas which he may
utilize. The first is to not answer to the court's8s charges s 6 In effect,
$VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.5 (Supp. 1968) expressly provides for service of
process for a nonresident upon the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in the manner
provided in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-67.1 to -67.2 (Supp. 1968). Section 46.1-387.5 makes
sections 8-67.1 to -67.2 applicable mutatis mutandis to habitual offender determination proceedings. Section 8-87.1 requires the Commissioner to forward the notice
of process to a nonresident by registered mail to complete valid substituted service.
Section 8-67.2 makes notice of process valid without a mailing if the Commonwealth's attorney attached to the notice of process delivered to the Commissioner
an affidavit that the Commonwealth's attorney does not know and is unable to obtain any post office address of the nonresident defendant.
The Attorney General of Virginia has rendered an opinion that the service
of process without mailing is valid for purposes of the Act in cases of former
Virginians moved to unknown addresses in other jurisdictions provided section 8-67.2
is followed. Letter from Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia, to C. H.
Lamb, Commissioner, Division of Motor Vehicles, Mar. 11, 1969.
53
See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.6 (Supp. 1968). Virginia proceedings concerning
suspension or revocation of the privilege to drive on the state's highways are civil
not criminal. Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941). Therefore,
orders from a civil proceeding on valid substituted service of process would seem
to be binding upon nonresidents. See note 82 supra. However, it seems doubtful
whether the felony penalties of section 46.1-387.8 could be imposed upon a nonresident who lacked actual notice of the habitual offender determination proceedings of section 46.1-387.5 and the subsequent prohibitory order of section 46.1-387.6.
8t
In response to the show cause order a suspected habitual offender appears
before the adjudicating court as a defendant in the sense that an information has
been filed against him by the Commonwealth's attorney. Hereafter the suspected
habitual offender, recipient of the show cause order, is referred to as the defendant.
$'Hereafter the court conducting the -habitual offender status determination is
referred to as the adjudicating court. This is the same court which issues the show
cause order. Hereafter the court which convicted the defendant of an offense shown
in the DMV record shall be referred to as the convicting court. The convicting
court will be a court of record for offenses under section 46.1-387.2(a) while it
generally may be either a court of record or court not of record for offenses
under section 46.1-3 87.2(b).
S'In Virginia's first three adjudications under the Act the defendants did not
contest their DMV records. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 8, 1969, § B, p. 4,
col. 6.
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the defendant is in no better position that had he not appeared at
all, since the prima facie rule under section 48.1-387.3 would apply
indiscriminately to both situations. Here the prima fade evidence
rule and the requirement of showing good cause are actually one
and the same. The reason the defendant must show good cause is
to rebut the presumption of the validity of the DMV record upon
which he may be adjudged an habitual offender with no other evidence.
The second defense available to the defendant is to plead that he
is not the person named in the DMV record which accompanied the
show cause order. Since the defendant's denial is equivalent to a
contention that there has been an administrative error, the denial
itself should be sufficient showing of cause to result in dismissal unless
the Commonwealth can clearly establish that the defendant and the
person named in the record are identical. The prima fade rule of
section 48.1-387.3 would be of no benefit to the Commonwealth as
the rule's presumption is operative only against the person named in
the record. Therefore, the rule remains inoperative until the Commonwealth proves that the person named in the record and the de87
fendant are one and the same.
The third defense available to the defendant is to collaterally
attack one or more convictions contained in the DMV record as having been erroneously included in the defendant's record. Although
such a claim may appear to be similar to the second defense, it can
be distinguished in the sense that the DMV record has already been established as that of the defendant's and he now seeks to defend by collaterally attacking a prior conviction within the record. Faced with
the denial of an underlying conviction the adjudicating court may
decide the issue itself or it may certify the decision to the original
convicting court as authorized by this section. The prima facie rule
as to the validity of convictions in the record casts the burden of proof
as to a denial of their validity upon the defendant.8 8 However, if
in fact a conviction has been mistakenly entered on the defendant's
DMV record, that fact normally should be a simple matter for him
67That the legislature foresaw the possibility of such an administrative error is
clear from the language of section 46.1-387.6 which provides for dismissal upon a
finding that the defendant is not the person named in the record. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.1-387.6 (Supp. 1968).
EVA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.3 (Supp. 1968).

294

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

to prove, especially with the certification provision of this section. s 9
The final defense available to the defendant is a collateral attack
upon one or more convictions contained in the DMV record as having
been improperly decided upon the merits. As in the third defense, the
adjudicating court has the discretion whether to decide such issue
itself or to certify the case to the convicting court to make such determination. Similarly, because of the prima facie rule, the defendant
has the burden of proving that such convictions were erroneously
decided.
An additional consideration in the fourth defense is whether a
collateral attack upon the merits is permissible. Here it must be
remembered that under Virginia law all traffic offenses are criminal
in nature 0 and thus trial by jury0 l is available as a matter of right.
After a proper waiver of a right to a trial by jury92 and/(or) the
expiration of the statutory period allotted for perfection of an appeal,9 3 decisions of trial courts become final and are res judicata in
subsequent legal proceedings.0 4 Generally this has been the approach
followed where underlying convictions have been challenged in proceedings under recidivist statutes.0 5 Although the United States
Supreme Court has ruled to the contrary where constitutionally protected rights were involved, relitigation is not required. Only an
inquiry to determine whether such rights were denied or abused is
necessary0 6 Therefore, it appears that a defendant will usually be
unsuccessful in collaterally attacking underlying convictions in the
record on the grounds that he was not properly convicted unless he
alleges violation of constitutional rights.
Under the third and fourth defenses the adjudicating court appears
8Apparently the jurisdiction of the convicting court over the subject matter or
the person could be raised as a defense theory. However, it seems that in many cases
the adjudicating court can determine for itself the validity of such a claim from
the name of the convicting court appearing on the face of the DMV record. Issues
as to proper subject matter or personal jurisdiction of a convicting court apparently
are controlled by VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-123 to -125 (Repl. Vol. 196o) (jurisdiction
of county, municipal and municipal traffic courts respectively) and by VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.1-187 (Repl. Vol. 196o) (exclusive original criminal jurisdiction of circuit
courts).
9°VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-6 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
"VA. CONSr. art. I, § 8; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-193 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
"'VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-193 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
OVA. Sup. CT. App. R. 5:1 § 4 grants sixty days. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-132 (Repl.
Vol. 196o) grants ten days for an appeal from a court not of record for a trial de
novo at a court of record.
"Kelly v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 522, 125 S.E. 437 (1924).
9Tyson v. Hening, 205 Va. 389, 136 S.E.2d 832, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964);
VA. CODE ANN. § 53-296 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
9Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
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to have discretionary power whether to certify a question as to the
validity of a prior conviction to the convicting court. An adjudicating
court, having before it a defendant whom it has found to be the
same person named in the DMV record, may not be sufficiently persuaded as to such person's having successfully sustained the burden
of proof requirement of section 46.1-387.8 to overcome the prima
facie status of the conviction record. As a result it may rule that it
has sufficient evidence to determine habitual offender status and, therefore, refuse to exercise its discretion to certify the issue. It would seem
that the only relief then available to the accused would be an appeal
under section 46.1-887.10 on the grounds of abuse of discretion by the
97
adjudicating court.
On appeal the Supreme Court of Appeals would be faced with
the choice of interpreting the wording as either a grant of discretion to
the adjudicating court or -the creation of a right in the defendant to
have denial questions certified to the convicting court. The former
construction might have harsh consequences on a defendant since the
extreme difficulty of obtaining an abuse of discretion ruling from an
appellate court is well known. On the other hand, an interpretation
creating a right to certification would certainly be open to abuse as
a delaying tactic. Since the use of certification to gain time would
result in useless litigation as well as temporary evasion of the Act, it
seems that the latter interpretation would reduce effective implementation of the Act to the detriment of highway safety.
PROHIBITORY ORDER

§ 48.1-387.6. Order of court.-If the court finds that such
person is not the same person named in the aforesaid transcript
or abstract, or that he is not an habitual offender under this
article, the proceeding shall be dismissed; but if the court
finds that such person is the same person named in the aforesaid transcript or abstract and that such person is an habitual
offender, the court shall so find and by appropriate order direct
such person not to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of
the Comonwealth of Virginia and to surrender to the court
all licenses or permits to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this State for disposal in the manner provided in §

"If

an adjudicating court certifies an issue to a convicting court, section
46.1-387.5 requires that the convicting court conduct a hearing to determine that
issue. The Act contains no specifics as to the details, procedure or nature of the
hearing by the convicting court. In view of the concepts of res judicata it seems
that such hearings would be concerned solely with verification of the record and,
in the majority of certifications, merely with identification of the defendant.
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46.1-425. The clerk of -the court shall file with the Division of
Motor Vehicles a copy of such order which shall become a
part of the permanent records of the Division.98
This section provides for the elimination of habitual offenders as
motor vehicle operators from the highways of Virginia. Under this
section there is no provision for lesser remedies; the adjudicating court
must unequivocably determine whether the defendant before it either
is or is not an habitual offender. In the event that the court finds that
such person is not the person named in the record from the DMV or
that such person is not an habitual offender as defined in section
46.1-387.-2, the proceeding is dismissed. But if it is determined that
the person before the court is the same as named in the transcript or
abstract and is an habitual offender under the Act, the court must issue
an order directing the defendant not to drive on Virginia highways
thereafter and command him to surrender all Virginia motor vehicle
operator licenses and permits.
The essential feature of this section is the jurisdictional effect and
the permanency of the prohibitory order. Since the power of the
Virginia courts terminates at the borders of the Commonwealth, the
order can have no extra-territorial effects and is applicable only to
,the roads and streets within those borders. This is not to say, however, that the order cannot reach beyond the state's boundaries and
command nonresidents not to drive in Virginia. The Act expressly
includes nonresidents in the definition of an habitual offender 99 as
well as making provision for jurisdiction over nonresidents by substituted service of process. 10° Thus a North Carolina resident can be
adjudged an habitual offender under the Act and ordered not to drive
in Virginia. 101

In the absence of action under subsequent sections of the Act to
restore the privilege to drive,10 2 the court's prohibitory order appears
"SVA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.6 (Supp. 1968).
09VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.2 (Supp. 1968).
'"VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.5 (Supp. 1968).

1'-No constitutional problem is presented by the jurisdictional effect of the
prohibitory order since the powers of the states to establish and enforce reasonable
standards for the promotion of traffic safety on the highways within their geographical limits has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court notwithstanding claims of freedom to travel or interferences with interstate commerce. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938);
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 61o (1915).
'*- VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-387.7, -387.9 (Supp. 1968).
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to be of a permanent and of a perpetual duration. 103 On first impression one might conclude that such a harsh and stringent result would
afford an appropriate basis for a constitutional claim of cruel and
unusual punishment. However, such conclusion overlooks the fact that
revocation of one's driving privilege under the habitual violator laws
does not constitute punishment; rather it is a civil measure considered
10 4
necessary by the legislature to adequately provide for public safety.
Furthermore, the mere fact of a lifetime duration of a civil proscription
does not necessarily render it either arbitrary or unreasonable. Courts
have long had the power to grant permanent injunctive relief where
it was considered necessary to protect the public health, safety and
welfare. 10 5 Even in the field of criminal law the authority of legislatures to declare that the conviction of a felony operates to permanently
06
holding public office' 0 7
bar a citizen from exercising voting rights,
08
or practicing law' has long been upheld by the judiciary not as an
additional penalty but rather for the protection of the public at large.
LICENSING PROHIBITION

§ 46.1-387.7. Period during which habitual offender not to
be licensed to operate motor vehicle.-No license to operate
motor vehicles in Virginia shall be issued to an habitual offender,
(I) for a period of ten years from the date of the order of the
court finding such person to be an habitual offender, and (2)
U"VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.6 (Supp. 1968) provides that the court order the
habitual offender not to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of Virginia;
no termination date is specified. Although a reading of this language as constituting
a lifetime revocation with section 46.1-387.9 creating a condition subsequent (showing of good cause after ten years to have the privilege restored) seems to be the
most logical interpretation, other constructions are possible. First, section 46.1-387.6
and section 46.1-387.9 read together may be viewed as merely a ten year prohibition.
Second, the language may be construed as meaning an indeterminate revocation
which the courts may, at their discretion, reinstate. This is equivalent to viewing
the court's discretion under section 46.1-387.9 as a condition precedent to restoration of the driving privilege.
'"Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941).
L"Fields in which injunctive relief has been granted to promote public health,
safety and welfare include nuisances, stream and air pollution, and zoning. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. McGovern, 16 Ky. 212, 75 S.W. 261 (19o3); City of Fayetteville
v. Spur Distrib. Co., 216 N.C. 596, 5 S.E.2d 838 (1939); Black v. Circuit Court, 78
S.D. 302, ioi N.V.2d 520 (196o).
IVA. CONST. art. II, § 23; VA. CODE ANN. § 24-18 (Repl. Vol. 1969). See generally
Young v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1152, 156 S.E. 565 (1931).
CODE ANN. § 2.1-36 (Repl. Vol. 1966). See Commonwealth v. Fugate, 29
"NVA.
Va. (2 Leigh) 724 (Gen. Ct. 1830).
lu0SVA. CODE ANN. § 54-73 (Repl. Vol. 1967). See Legal Club v. Light, 137 Va.

249, 119 S.X. 55

(1923).
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until the privilege of such person to operate a motor vehicle
in this State has been restored by an order of a court of record
entered in a proceeding as thereinafter provided. 109
After a person has been adjudged an habitual offender under the
Act, subsequent issuance of a Virginia driver's license is conditioned
upon the passage of at least ten years and upon restoration of the driving privilege by court order as prescribed in section 46.1-387.9. The
significant factor in the present section, however, is that restoration of
the driver's license after ten years is by no means automatic. Ten years
merely marks the earliest date of restoration.11 0
VIOLATION OF PROHIBITORY ORDER

§ 46.1-387.8. Operation of motor vehicle by habitual offender
prohibited; penalty; enforcement of section.-It shall be unlawful for any person to operate any motor vehicle in this State
while the order of the court prohibiting such operation remains
in effect. Any person found to be an habitual offender under
the provisions of this article who is thereafter convicted of
operating a motor vehicle in this State while the order of the
court prohibiting such operation is in effect, shall be punished
by confinement in the penitentiary not less than one nor more
than five years and no portion of such sentence shall be suspended, except that in cases wherein such operation is necessitated in situations of apparent extreme emergency which require such operation to save life or limb, said sentence, or any
part thereof may be suspended.
For the purpose of enforcing this section, in any case in
which the accused is charged with driving a motor vehicle while
his license, permit or privilege to drive is suspended or revoked
or is charged with driving without a license, the court before
hearing such charge shall determine whether such person has
been held an habitual offender and by reason of such holding is
barred from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this
State. If the court determines the accused has been so held, it
shall certify the case to the court of record of its jurisdiction
for trial.1 1'
"'OVA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.7 (Supp. 1968).
"'0Subsections (i) and (2) must be read together as conditions precedent to the
reissue of a Virginia driver's license to an habitual offender. First, at least ten
years must pass between the adjudicating procedure and its prohibitory order.
Second, after ten years an habitual offender may then petition a court of record
for restoration of the privilege to drive in Virginia. At its discretion the court may
restore
the privilege. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-387.7, -387.9 (Supp. 1968).
1
-VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.8 (Supp. 1968).
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To enforce court orders prohibiting habitual offenders from driving in Virginia, the General Assembly created a new statutory crime.
This section declares it to be a felony for an habitual offender to
operate a motor vehicle in Virginia in disobedience of the driving
interdiction issued at the time of his being adjudged an habitual
offender. Punishment for this offense is confinement in the penitentiary
for a period of from one to five years. Furthermore, the statute specifically states that no portion of the sentence can be suspended except in
the rare case of extreme emergency where driving appeared necessary
to save life or limb. To eliminate the possibility that an habitual
offender might escape prosecution under this section by being charged
with a lesser offense, courts are required in all cases of driving on a
suspended or revoked license and driving without a license to ascertain
whether such person has been previously adjudged an habitual
offender. 112 It would thus seem that the legislature has provided sanctions sufficiently stringent to compel the compliance of habitual offenders with the "no-driving" mandate of the courts.
Inasmuch as driving in disobedience of a court's prohibitory order
is not only made a crime but also a felony, the habitual offender will
be entitled to a trial by jury."13 The elements of the crime are clear:
namely, that the defendant had been adjudged an habitual offender
on the basis of his DMV record and judicially ordered not to drive
thereafter in Virginia and that the defendant did operate a motor
vehicle at a certain time and place during the prohibited period. At
the trial, conclusive proof of the first element can be accomplished
merely by entering into evidence a copy of the official prohibitory
order which issued from the habitual offender proceeding and then
showing that the defendant and named habitual offender are the same
person. With respect to the question of guilt or innocence the jury's
role will in essence amount to deciding the single fact issue of whether
the defendant drove at the time and place charged.
It is possible that juries may look with disfavor at enforcement
trials under the Act because of the apparent harshness and severity of
the underlying driving prohibition as well as the enforcement penalty.
Perhaps the legislature wisely foresaw this possibility when it amended
'"Apparently this provision was designed to operate in conjunction with VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.1-413.1 (Supp. 1968) which requires all officers who issue a sum-

mong for driving under the influence of intoxicants or drugs, speeding, reckless
driving, hit and run or driving without a license to cause a copy of the driver's
DMV record to be sent to the Commonwealth's attorney and the court with
jurisdiction over the charge.
I-NA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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the Habitual Offender Bill to provide for the mitigation of the sent4
ence in the event of driving in a bona fide emergency situation."
The important factor to note here, however, is that the mitigation is
in the form of permitting the suspension of sentence and does not
bear upon the issue of guilt or innocence. Therefore, in an emergency
situation the jury must convict the defendant of a felony if it is
found that he did in fact drive during the prohibitory period even
though the sentence may be suspended. If the emergency situation
clause had been drafted in such a manner as to constitute some sort
of temporary authority to drive in spite of the prohibitory order, the
Act's enforcement would have been vulnerable to a defendant's convincing a jury of his innocence in situations of questionable emergency. 115 As enacted the Act's enforcement can be completely frustrated
only if a jury refuses to convict in spite of uncontradicted evidence of
6
guilt."1
When faced with a felony charge under the enforcement section,
a defendant may seek to collaterally attack the crucial determination
of his status as an habitual offender. In this context two situations are
foreseeable. First is the case where the defendant at the prior hearing
where he was adjudged an habitual offender unsuccessfully contested
the jurisdiction of a court in one of the traffic convictions requisite
to such finding as an habitual offender. The defendant again seeks to
question the jurisdiction and invokes the general rule that the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction can always be raised at any point in the
n'VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.8 (Supp. 1968). No emergency situation provision
was contained in the Habitual Offender Bill recommended to the General Assembly.
See VIRGINIA TRAFFIC SAFETY STUDY COMMISSION, AN ACTION PROGRAM TO MIT
VIRGINIA'S TRAFFIC SAFETv NEEDs go (1967); VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE

AGENTS, INC., HABITUAL OFFENDER BILL 4 (1967).

2'A jury could frustrate the enforcement of the Act to a limited degree by relying upon the emergency provision even where such emergency was questionable. For
some defendants the main concern would be the penitentiary sentence itself and
a felony conviction with a suspended sentence would be of little import. Such a
defendant would not go to prison but would remain free to drive again.
"'The Act might be constitutionally challenged on the grounds that a criminal
punishment which denies the opportunity for a suspended sentence in all but
the very restricted emergency situation is cruel and unusual. It might also be urged
that almost total removal of discretion in the process of criminal sentencing constitutes a denial of due process of law. Although such issues may be raised, it does
not seem likely that the enforcement section is in jeopardy of beng held unconstitutional in view of the fact that similar arguments have consistently failed when
advanced against recidivist statutes. E.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967);
People v. Kostal, 159 Cal. App. 2d 444, 323 P.2d 1o2o (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); People
v. Gowasky, 219 App. Div. 19, 219 N.Y.S. 373 (1926), aff'd, 244 N.Y. 451, 155 N.E,
737 (1927).
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proceedings. The second situation is one where no jurisdictional objections were raised at the habitual offender hearing but are now
raised at the felony trial.
Obviously, a holding that permitted collateral attacks to the underlying habitual offender determination would seriously complicate the
felony trial by necessitating a re-determination as an habitual offender.
Also, such a ruling would seem to conflict with the legislative intent
that habitual offender status determinations be made by the courts
in an administrative manner as provided in sections 46.1-387.3 to -387.6.
The fact that appeals are specifically authorized in section 46.1-387.10
from any final action or order of a court pursuant to the Act seems
to indicate that the General Assembly contemplated res judicata standing for such final actions and orders after appeal or upon the lapse of
117
the statutory period for appeal.
RESTORATION OF DRIVING PRIVILEGES

§ 48.1-387.9. Restoration of privilege of operating motor
vehicle.-At the expiration of ten years from the date of any
final order of a court entered under the provisions of this
article, finding a person to be an habitual offender and directing him not to operate a motor vehicle in this State, such person may petition the court in which he was found -to be an
habitual offender, or any court of record in Virginia having
criminal jurisdiction in the political subdivision in which such
person then resides, for restoration of his privilege to operate
a motor vehicle in this State. Upon such petition, and for good
cause shown, such court may, in its discretion, restore to such
person the privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State
upon such terms and conditions as 'the court may prescribe,
17Another problem of the felony enforcement provision of the Act conceivably
could be a clash with the procedural and substantive due process requirements of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Inasmuch as the Miranda rules attach as
soon as an individual's freedom of movement is curtailed, it would appear that
the Commonwealth would be barred from the use of a "confession" of habitual
offender status made to a police officer who had stopped a driver and requested
his license. However, VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-413.1 (Supp. 1968) requires an officer
issuing a summons for specified offenses to obtain a copy of the driver's DMV
record for the court with jurisdiction over the case, and VA. CODE ANN. §46.1-387.8
(Supp. 1968) requires the court to make an independent determination that an
individual has been adjudged an habitual offender before charges under the enforcement section can be brought. Thus, the "confession" will not be necessary for
a conviction and any lack of substantive due process afforded felons seems to be

overcome,
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subject to other provisions of law relating to the issuance of
operators' or chauffeurs' licenses." 8
The order finding a person an habitual offender and directing him
not to drive in Virginia thereafter is a permanent prohibition." 9 This
section provides for the possibility of having such indeterminate interdiction cancelled and the privilege of driving restored. Ten years after
the prohibitory order is issued, the habitual offender may petition
either the court which issued the order or the court having criminal
jurisdiction over his Virginia residence for restoration of his driving
privileges. This section makes it clear, however, that the burden of
persausion rests with the petitioner to show good cause why such
prohibitory order should be revoked. Furthermore, the granting of
the petition with the subsequent restoration of driving privileges is
expressly at the discretion of the court and may be conditioned upon
such terms as the court may prescribe.
Upon the failure of a court to grant a restoration petition it appears that the only remedy available is an appeal alleging abuse of
discretion. It is generally accepted that the likelihood of securing a
favorable decision on an appeal grounded solely upon abuse of judicial
discretion is remote. This is particularly true where the grant of
discretionary powers has been expressly declared by the legislature.
APPEALs

§ 46.1-387.1o. Appeals.-An appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia may be had from any final action or order
of a court of record entered under the provisions of this article
would be noted,
in the same manner and form as such an appeal
120
perfected and tried in any criminal case.
This section provides that an appeal may be taken from an habitual offender determination under section 46.1-387.6 and from a felony
conviction under section 46.1-387.8 in the same manner as in any
criminal case. The imposition of a criminal procedure for appeals
would have no detrimental effect upon the felony conviction since it
would be governed by this procedure even in the absence of this section. However, a criminal appellate procedure may have an adverse
effect upon the habitual offender determination.
Where the driving privilege is suspended or revoked by the DMV
USVA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.9 (Supp. 1968).

lVA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.6 (Supp. 1968). See note io 3 supra and accompanying text.
1-0VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.10 (Supp. 1968).
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under mandatory statutes, 121 provision is made for an appeal to the
judiciary. 122 However, the Supreme Court of Appeals has held that no
appeal from such mandatory administrative action shall lie except
to determine the identity of the person concerned when the question
of identity is in dispute 123 or to determine whether an underlying
conviction is void on its face. 124 Since the Act provides an administrative process performed by the courts and resulting in mandatory
revocation of the driving privilege if the defendant is adjudged an
habitual offender, 25 it seems that the scope of appellate inquiry could
have been similarly limited to issues of identity or manifest error. The
imposition of a criminal appellate procedure apparently will subject
the entire record of the habitual offender adjudication to review. However, frustration of the Act's mandatory procedures seems unlikely
since the issues on appeal would be the same as those at the habitual
offender adjudication and equally as limited.
This section contains one other aspect which could be harmful to
the effective accomplishment of the purposes of the Act. As was noted
previously, 12 once a motorist has been adjudged an habitual offender,
the court orders him not to drive upon the highways of Virginia until
such prohibition is lifted, and also orders the surrender of all Virginia
licenses and permits to drive for disposal under section 46.1-425 of the
Code. In turn, that section directs the return of the license to a driver
after an appeal is effected and proper bond posted. 27 The reinstate2
L'
Code sections requiring mandatory suspension or revocation by the DMV
include: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-417, -419, -420, -427 (Repl. Vol. 1967); VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.1-421 (Supp. 1968).
'2Appeal may be to the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond or to any
court of record having jurisdiction over the driver's place of residence. VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.1-437 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
'2Lamb v. Curry, 197 Va. 395, 89 S.E.2d 329 (1955); Dillon v. Joyner, 192 Va.
559, 66 S.E.2d 583 (1951); Morrison v. Commonwealth ex rel. Joyner, 19o Va. 527, 58
S.E.2d 3o (1950).
"'Dillon v. Joyner, 192 Va. 559, 66 S.E.2d 583 (1931); Scott v. Commonwealth
ex rel. Joyner, 191 Va. 73, 6o S.E.2d 14 (1950).
!-VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.6 (Supp. 1968). See text accompanying note 98 supra.
'2-VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.6 (Supp. 1968). See text accompanying note 98 supra.
2
TVA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-425 (Repl. Vol. 1967). Apparently this section is
directed merely towards those mandatory provisions of the Code and the Act which
require a revocation or suspension of a driver's license as a matter of law. It does
not apply to those revocation provisions which may be utilized at a court's discretion. The apparent rationale of this section is that a license is suspended or revoked as an operation of law from a final determination of a case and that point
has not been reached if the defendant effectuates and perfects an appeal. This
rationale would equally apply to the mandatory provisions of the Act.
If a driver has already been adjudged an habitual offender and is convicted
of driving during the prohibitory order, this section should not be applicable when
he appeals under section 46.1-387.1o as this section presupposes a driver has a
license when convicted. Here an habitual offender does not.
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ment of the privilege to drive to an adjudged habitual offender pending an appeal is a legislative directive and must be followed by the
courts. However, such action appears to be inconsistent with the
fundamental purposes of the Act. Since a series of convictions is required for a finding as an habitual offender, it is highly improbable
that a totally innocent person could be so adjudged. Therefore, it
would seem that the public's safety is best protected by continuing the
court's prohibitory order even while such action is being appealed.
Perhaps this will be a subject of legislative concern in the future.
EFFECTS UPON EXISTING LAws

§ 48.1-387.11. Construction of article.-Nothing in this
article shall be construed as amending, modifying or repealing
any existing law of Virginia or any existing ordinance of any
political subdivision relating to the operation or licensing of
motor vehicles, the licensing of persons to operate motor
vehicles or providing penalties for the violation thereof; or
shall be construed so as to preclude the exercise of the regulatory powers of any division, agency, department or political
subdivision of the Commonwealth having
the statutory power
128
to regulate such operation and licensing.
While it is expressly stated that the Act is not 'to be interpreted
as amending, modifying or repealing any existing Virginia law, the
Act does have the effect of either modifying or eliminating the need
for certain provisions in the motor vehicle code. Sections 46.1-423.1
and 46.1-423.2 are essentially concerned with the same major violations
as is section 46.1-387.2(a) of the Act. The former sections provide for
revocation of the license for five years upon conviction of four major
offenses within a ten year period, while section 46.1-387.2(a) requires
only three convictions with a minimum revocation period of ten
years. Therefore, section 46.1-387.2(a) appears to have eliminated the
utility of the code sections, assuming efficient enforcement of the Act.
Another problem may arise under this section by a possible connection of the Habitual Offender Act with Virginia's recidivist proceeding. 129 The recidivist statute provides basically that if a person
is sentenced to a term in the penitentiary and it is found that such
person has previously been sentenced to like punishment, he may be
sentenced to such additional punishment as the court deems proper.
In order to sentence an accused under this recidivist proceeding as
a second offender, it need only be shown that he has been convicted
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.11 (Supp. 1968).
'2"VA. CODE ANN. § 53-296 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
7'
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and sentenced to the penitentiary and that thereafter he committed
a second penitentiary offense and was sentenced and received in the
30
penitentiary therefor1
Where an habitual offender is convicted and sentenced to the
penitentiary for driving in disobedience of the prohibitory order, he
apparently could receive an additional sentence under the recidivist
statute if he has previously served a similar felony sentence. Likewise,
if a person has been sentenced to the penitentiary under the Act and
later is sentenced for some other felonious offense, he apparently is
liable for additional sentencing under the recidivist procedure.' 31
Because of the two penalties that could be imposed upon a defendant,
it seems doubtful that the General Assembly intended to expose an
habitual offender of traffic laws to recidivist proceedings.
CONCLUSION

Virginia recently assumed a role of national leadership in highway
safety legislation when the General Assembly enacted the new and
unique Habitual Offender Law. The fundamental purpose of the
Act is to promote highway safety by removing habitual violators of
traffic laws from the streets and highways of the Commonwealth.
Effective regulation and control of habitual offenders seems virtually
certain due to the combined action of the major features of the Act.
These vital provisions assure: (I) that suspected habitual offenders
are identified; (2) that a judicial determination of a suspected driver's
status as an habitual offender follows his detection automatically without an opportunity for avoidance; (3) that those adjudged habitual
offenders are prohibited from driving on Virginia highways either
permanently or at least for a minimum of ten years; and (4) that the
driving interdiction is enforceable with penalties of considerable
severity. Compliance with the driving prohibition by habitual offenders
seems almost inevitable in view of the stringent enforcement section.
From the stringent enforcement provision of the Act it is apparent
that the General Assembly intended to compel obedience to the driving prohibition imposed upon habitual offenders. When this exmTyson v. Hening, 205 Va. 389, 136 S.E.2d 832, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867
(1964). VA. CODE ANN. § 53-296 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
mThe converse where the suspended sentence felony conviction precedes a
later felony conviction resulting in a sentence in the penitentiary would not subject
one to additional sentencing under the recidivist statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-296
(Repl. Vol. 1967) requires that one be convicted and sentenced the requisite number
of times. Apparently, convictions where one is pardoned or when the sentence is
suspended do not count against one for recidivist purposes. See 48 VA. L. REv. 597
(1962).
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posure to a felony conviction and a highly probable sentence to the
penitentiary is combined with the long term, or even permanent, loss
of the privilege to drive in Virginia, the Act should have considerable
deterrent effect upon those drivers who might otherwise tend to disregard traffic laws. In spite of the fact that the Act appears to possess
sanctions of sufficient severity to control habitual offenders as well as
to discourage others from becoming habitual offenders, only time will
tell how effective these crucial provisions will prove to be.
Although highway safety will definitely be improved by the Act's
elimination from the driving public of a large proportion of those who
habitually violate traffic laws, it does not follow that it will solve all
or even a majority of traffic safety problems. Drivers who do not fall
within the definition of an habitual offender but who still violate
traffic laws are unquestionably hazardous. Yet they are unaffected by
the Act. Also, other aspects of traffic safety such as defective vehicles,
poorly designed highways, as well as overcrowded or out-dated highways are clearly not within the ambit of the Act. The Act, then, can
be expected to significantly enhance highway safety but not to offer
a panacea to the traffic safety problem in general.
Undoubtedly the Act will be assailed by critics as being both too
harsh and too lenient. Undoubtedly it will be challenged in the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia as being both unconstitutional
and unreasonable. It seems, however, that the Virginia Habitual
Offender Act will survive its critics since it was drafted in such a
manner as to carefully balance the need of providing for highway
safety without unduly restricting the rights and privileges of individual
citizens. Furthermore, the Act seems certain to make a significant and
continuing contribution to safety upon Virginia's highways by precluding the presence of habitual offenders.
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